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I. Introduction 
 
South Korea, Korea hereafter, has shown rapid economic growth since the 1960s.  The 
government has provided various incentives to promote exports, expecting export-led 
economic growth.  Export values increased from US$87 million in 1963 to US$17.5 
billion in 1980, and then to US$363.5 billion in 2009.  Although import values were 
more than 6 (2.3) times larger than export values in 1963 (1971), trade surpluses have 
been recorded since 1998.  The trade dependence ratio defined as (export values + 
import values)/GNP increased from 46.6 percent in 1972 to 78.9 percent in 1980, to 
76.6 percent in 2001 and then to 98.6 percent in 2009.  Thus, the Korean economy is 
regarded as one showing very high trade dependence ratio.  In the meantime, per capita 
GNP increased from less than US$100 in 1960 to US$1,688 in 1980, to US$12,581 in 
1996 and then to US$17,085 in 2009.  Export expansion has been believed to be 
possible by aggressive export promotion (EP) policies, in particular in the early stage of 
economic development.  The Korean government provided tax and financial incentives 
in addition to incentives such as establishment of organizations to promote exports.  
Thus, the experience of economic growth of Korea has been regarded as an example of 
pursuing the export-led economic growth strategy. 
 
Although the Korean government provided many types of export incentives in its rapid 
economic growth, the World Trade Organization (WTO) system strictly regulates most 
such incentives to promote exports.  Therefore, developing countries trying to pursue 
export-led economic growth strategy are not free to take many EP measures that were 
provided by the Korean government during the period of very rapid economic growth.  
The current paper explains the EP measures taken by the Korean government, points out 
their contributions and problems, and provides developing countries pursuing economic 
growth with the implications under the WTO system drawn from the experience of 
Korea. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section II explains the effect of EP policies on 
exports and economic growth.  Section III shows the overall patterns of the EP policies 
of Korea during the 1960s – 2000s.  Section IV explains various export incentives that 
have been provided by the Korean government.  Section V evaluates the EP policies 
pursued by the Korean government and draw implications for economic development of 
developing countries.  Section VI provides conclusions. 
 
 
II. The Effect of Export Promotion on Economic Growth 
 
A. Benefits and Costs of Export Promotion Policies 
 
The outward-oriented economic development strategy has often been compared with the 
inward-orientation strategy.  Chris Milner emphasizes that outward orientation (OO) 
and government intervention are separate issues. For EP, the role of government is 
essential.
 1
  If financial benefits are conferred by the government to exports 
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conditional on export performance, they would be regarded as export subsidies.  
 
For economic growth and welfare improvement of a national economy, OO is expected 
to dominate inward orientation or import substitution (IS) in the following manner.  
First, assuming economies of scale, expanded sales opportunities due to participation in 
international trade would lead to lower average production cost and higher profit level.  
Second, due to severer competition in the international market, productivity 
improvement can be expected from OO.  There may be potential economy-wide 
benefits from “intensifying competitive pressures and managerial efficiency, 
accelerating technical progress by greater contact with foreign institutions and ideas”. 2  
Third, the rapid economic growth performance of the East Asian countries show that the 
OO strategy is superior to the IS strategy. 
 
In addition to the benefits of OO, we can also expect the rationale for EP by the 
government.  First, as Falvey and Gemmell notice, EP measures may be justified, first, 
to remedy anti-export bias made by import protection.  That is, import protection 
harms exports through two channels: it reduces domestic exporters‟ competitiveness in 
international markets by raising the cost of imported inputs in production of 
exportables; and it reduces the incentives for the production of exportables relative to 
importables.  EP policies might be justified as an attempt to compensate for the effects 
of such anti-export bias.
3
  Second, infant-exporter argument for temporary assistance 
has been suggested, based on the idea that entering the new export markets is a difficult 
and costly activity with the cumulative volume of exports having a favorable effect on 
the unit cost of exports.
4
  Third, we can think of the strategic trade policy argument.  
According to it, exports subsidized by the government may pre-empt the international 
market and the domestic company can get the monopoly profit, as the foreign 
competitor is driven out.
5
  The above-explained rationale for EP can be summarized as 
the role of government regarding policies to transfer resources from less productive 
toward more productive uses.
6
 
 
One can also think of the costs of those.  First, as certain amount of government 
expenditure is directed to EP, it sacrifices its allocation to the other sectors such as 
social welfare or the non-export related production activities.  Second, the resource 
allocational inefficiencies may arise from government intervention in the market.
7
  
Therefore, whether budget allocation to EP is more efficient in terms of welfare 
improvement of the national economy as a whole may be doubtful.  Third, provision of 
tax incentives means loss of tax revenue.  Given the fact that lots of developing 
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countries do not have sufficient tax base, it can be a big loss with respect to tax 
collection.  Fourth, if financial incentives are provided to the private companies via 
government control of the banking sector, it may lead to lending to inefficient projects 
and, consequently, increasing debt-equity ratio of the concerned banking sector.  In the 
long run, development of the financial sector would be retarded.  Fifth, pursuing EP 
may influence the income distribution of a concerned economy.  It may benefit the 
exporters, but harm the producers in non-exportables and the taxpayers in general.  
 
B. Empirical Evidence 
 
Although it is a common sense that export expansion leads to economic growth, there 
have been empirical works testing it.  The empirical literature started from regression 
analyses examining correlation.  Beginning from the mid-1980s, the Granger causality 
tests were applied to the relationship between export growth and economic growth.  
Threshold effect has also been studied in the literature.  According to it, export-led 
growth does not hold until certain level of economic development, while it holds after 
the threshold level.  Conclusions of such empirical works have been mixed.  That is, 
export-led growth has not been supported unanimously by empirical works. Hans 
Singer expressed the view that the positive effect of OO became not so evident since the 
mid-1970s even in the Newly Industrializing Countries.
 8
 
 
Reflecting the popularity of non-stationarity and cointegration tests in empirical 
economic analysis, export-economic growth causality tests have been performed using 
cointegration tests and error-correction models since the 1990s. Awokuse uses Johansen 
cointegration test and Granger causality tests based on the error correction models 
applied to Argentina, Colombia and Peru.  Awokuse shows that there is some empirical 
evidence supporting the export-led growth hypothesis.
9
  Iyer, Rambadi and Tang 
(2009) use a cointegrated vector autoregressive model, complemented by a Granger 
causality test and show that exports are shown to be not significant in explaining 
economic growth of Australia.
10
  Thus, the empirical evidence appears to be mixed.  
Amin Guitierrez de Pineres and Cantavella-Jorda (2007) use data for sixteen Latin 
American countries and conclude that the results for the export-led growth hypothesis 
differ depending on the selection of data and test methodologies.   
 
As an extension of the causality between export expansion and economic growth, a 
group of works has tested the hypothesis that changes in export product composition 
cause economic growth.  The empirical evidence has shown support of the hypothesis 
in general.  Ghatak et. al. used cointegration and causality tests to examine the export-
led growth hypothesis for Malaysia and found that economic growth of Malaysia was 
driven by manufacturing exports rather than exports of primary goods.
11
  Koh and Mah 
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apply cointegration test and error correction models to Korea.  Their results show that 
the increasing ratio of non-textile, i.e. heavy and chemical industries, exports to textile 
exports has led to higher economic growth and vice versa.  Trade liberalization is 
shown to have a positive effect on economic growth of Korea.
 12
   
 
Unlike the works examining the causality between export growth and economic growth, 
some authors have tested whether EP measures actually lead to export expansion 
significantly.  Jung and Lee (1986) investigated the effects of various types of export 
promotion policies on the amount of manufactured export in Korea.  They establish an 
aggregate export supply function where relative prices, subsidy and capacity utilization 
ratio as the domestic demand pressure variable are used as the explanatory variables.  
Subsidies comprise preferential export finance, tariff reduction and exchange rate 
changes.  Using data for the period 1964 – 1980, they show that a 1 percent increase in 
subsidy would bring about 2 percent increase in export supply.  Although it is the first 
empirical work on the effect of EP policy on export, the measure of export subsidy 
includes neither export insurance nor duty drawback.  Mah‟s (2007c) cointegration test 
result shows that duty drawback scheme was effective in promoting export supply of 
Korea during 1975-2001.  Lederman et al. (2010) used data covering 103 developing 
and developed countries.  Their cross section analysis shows that export promotion 
agencies have a statistically significant effect on export expansion; meanwhile, they do 
not consider export incentives such as export insurance and duty drawback.  
 
 
III. Export Patterns of Korea since the 1960s
13
 
 
By the early 1960s, the Korean government had pursued import substitution policy.  In 
1964, the government announced pursuing export promotion policies with the slogan 
“Export Number One”, i.e. export promotion is the most important policy.  The 
government began to increase the amount of export subsidy, placing emphasis on 
exports of the products of the labor intensive Light Industries (LI), in particular textile 
and garment industry where the Korean economy had a comparative advantage.
14
  The 
government introduced 50 percent reduction of profit tax relating to exports and export 
finance schemes at low interest rate in 1964.  Exchange rate devaluation contributed to 
export promotion as well.  For instance, the exchange rate which was devalued from 
time to time, i.e. from 255 won/US$ in 1964 to 484 won/US$ in 1974.  Under the 
export-import link system, the government granted the exporters the right to use foreign 
exchange necessary for imports, which was intended to promote exports under the 
situation of extreme foreign exchange shortage.
15
 The government developed land sites 
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for industrial complexes and provided them cheaply to the firms entering those.
16
 
Together with various tax and financial measures to promote exports, the government 
established the institutions to support EP.  
 
In 1965, the Korean government chose the following LI products as those appropriate 
for export-led industrialization, i.e. raw silk, cotton fabrics, plywood, leather, craftwork, 
potteries, rubber products, radio and electric appliances, fisheries and mushroom cans, 
wool products, clothes, and miscellaneous products, which reflected the then economic 
development level of Korea.  It provided EP measures to the manufacturers producing 
those selected products.  As of 1967, the textile industry shared one third (a quarter) of 
all manufacturing sectors in terms of the number of workers (income).  The Korean 
government began to establish Woolsan Petrochemical Industrial Estates and the 
POSCO in the late 1960s.  In 1967, Korea became a GATT contracting party and 
export products of Korea were accorded the most-favored-nation status in the global 
trading system.
 17
  
 
During the 1970s, the main thrust of the industrial policy of Korea shifted from the LI to 
developing the high value-added HCI.
 
 The rising wage level which tended to 
undermine the international competitiveness of the labor intensive LI also forced the 
government to change the engine of economic growth.
18
  The government chose iron 
and steel, non-ferrous metal, shipbuilding, electronics and chemical industries as the 
most important HCI.
19
  The share of the HCI in all industries increased from 23 
percent in 1960 to 39 percent in 1970, and then to 54 percent in 1980.
20
  Overall, the 
spectacular economic growth of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Table 1, was 
accompanied by rapid export growth.  Due to over-investment in the HCI, the capacity 
utilization ratio of the HCI declined in the late 1970s.  Structural problems such as 
those resulting from the government-dependent inefficient banking system began to be 
observed in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
21
  To overcome the problems arising 
from excess capacity of certain HCI the so-called HCI Rationalization Measures were 
taken during 1979 – 1981, which included the postponement or withholding of the 
capacity expansion schedules with respect to certain HCI such as diesel engine, tire, 
machinery, and shipbuilding.
22
 
 
In 1981, the government began to emphasize the importance of research and 
development (R&D) and expressed to continue the export-led growth strategy.  
Consequently, since 1983, the government‟s attention shifted away from sector-oriented 
support such as the HCI Drive toward function-oriented support, support for R&D in 
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particular,
23
 which means that the importance of export support granted to specific 
industries or firms weakened after the mid-1980s.  Such an emphasis on R&D led to 
increase in exports of technology-based electronic products since the late 1980s.
24
 
 
Table 1.  Economic Growth, Exports and Exports/GDP in Korea 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Years        real GDP growth     export values      exports/GDP         
               rate (percent)      (US$ billions)        (percent)             
______________________________________________________________________ 
1962-1966      8.0       1     7.7 
1967-1971      9.7       3    13.7 
1972-1976      8.4     22    27.8 
1977-1981      6.1     77    31.5 
1982-1986      8.7   141    34.4 
1987-1991      9.2   307    32.1 
1992-1996      7.0   510    28.7 
1997-2001      4.3   734    42.8 
2002-2006      4.8         1,239    31.2 
2007-2009      2.5         1,186    42.2 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2004; The Bank of Korea, 
Economic Statistics Yearbook 2010.  
 
In the late 1990s, the government decided to promote the capital goods industry.  
Therefore, in 1995, it announced the Capital Goods Industries Promotion Plan, which 
was expected to promote the high value-added capital goods industries by supporting 
the development of new products and establishing them as the main export industries.  
Meanwhile, the government has pursued deregulation and market opening measures to 
strengthen the market mechanism and even right after the occurrence of the economic 
crisis in 1998, Korea eliminated several remaining direct export subsidies.  The 
government currently promotes exports by supporting international marketing activities 
and exhibitions abroad.  In addition to such indirect measures, certain export 
promotion measures such as provision of export insurances and duty drawback not 
exceeding threshold levels are provided to the exporters, since they are not prohibited 
by the current WTO regulations.   
 
With the EP policies mainly targeting the HCI, export values increased by leaps and 
bounds.  Table 1 shows the tendency of real GDP growth rate, export values and the 
ratio of exports/GDP since 1962.  Annual average real economic growth rate reached 
over 8 percent until the mid-1970s.  Export values increased from just US$ 1 billion 
during 1962-1966 to US$ 77 billion during 1977-1981.  The share of exports in GDP 
increased from mere 7.7 percent during 1962-1966 to 27.8 percent during 1972-1976 
and then to 42.2 percent in 2007-2009. 
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Table 2 shows the changing commodity structure of exports in Korea.  Although 
textiles and garments shared some 42 percent of total export values in 1968, the share 
decreased to 29 percent in 1980, and then to less than 3 percent in 2006.  The share of 
HCI increased from about 9 percent in 1968 to 41 percent in 1980 and then to 84 
percent in 2006.  Exports of products belonging to the primary industry accounted for 
37 percent of the total exports in 1968, while its share is less than 1 percent nowadays.  
Table 2 demonstrates that the share of electronic products continued to increase from 
the 1970s.
25
   
 
Table 2.  Exports by Principal Commodity   (unit: US$ billion) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Year        total LI    HCI 
                  Textiles    iron & steel  electric/electro.  cars 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1968  (US$    455     n.a.       193      41         1             19          0 
million) 
1980          17.5     n.a.        5.2     7.2        1.7            1.9         1.2 
1991        71.9    26.1    13.8    41.0       5.7     17.0  1.5    
2000       172.3    30.3    15.1   127.6       11.4     62.0        11.1 
2006       325.5    26.9    8.8   270.4       27.2     89.8    30.5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------
sources: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1972, 1982, 2007  
 
 
IV. The Export Promotion Measures of Korea 
 
The EP measures of Korea have comprised tax incentives, financial incentives, 
establishment of free trade zones and the supporting organizations.  The government 
provided huge amount of subsidy to promote export-related industries. The export 
subsidy ratio of Korea during the aggressive EP period, i.e. the mid-1960s to the early 
1980s, differed depending on the calculation methods.  Effective subsidy for exports 
reached the following: Korea: 31 percent; Taiwan: 12 percent; Colombia: 10 percent; 
Singapore: 0 percent.
26
  Chong-Hyun Nam calculated implicit subsidies to export sales 
as of the year 1978 on the basis of interest-rate differentials between export loans and 
ordinary bank loans and reduction in direct taxes, under the assumption that other 
incentives were either not genuine subsidies or negligibly small in amount.  For the 
manufacturing sector, the subsidy rate for export sales was 15.9 percent, whereas that 
for domestic sales was 3.5 percent.  It implies that there were greater incentives to 
export than to sell in the domestic market.
27
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Together with the EP policies, Korea practiced import protection policies.  Protection 
measures targeting import substitution may have anti-export bias in the sense that the 
production resources are to be allocated among non-tradables, exportables and 
importables.
28
  Import barriers such as tariffs or any other non-tariff barriers would 
tend to raise the price level of importables, thus directing production resources from 
exportables to importables.  Therefore, the fact that the Korean government pursued 
export promotion as well as import protection policies during the 1960s and 1970s 
actually mean that some of the resources might have been directed to importables 
production, although the benefits to exports would have dominated the costs from high 
price level of importables.  
 
A. Tax Incentives 
 
a. tax incentives in general  
 
In December 1961, the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law began to provide 
export firms with tax deduction measures.  Since 1964, tax benefits such as 80 percent 
reduction of profit tax were provided to profits arising from exports.  In 1967, export 
firms were allowed to depreciate their machinery investments 30 percent more rapidly 
than that normally allowed for additional tax benefits.
29
  Since 1973, as a measure of 
the HCI Drive, the strategic HCI such as steel, chemical, shipbuilding and machinery 
industries began to be exempt from domestic taxes such as profits tax during the first 
three years of establishment and exemption of half of the taxes for the next two years.  
The Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law amended in 1975 granted investment 
tax credits and accelerated depreciation to designated key industries.
30
  
 
Tax benefits began to be offered on the function-oriented support schemes, i.e. support 
of R&D activities, since 1982.
31
  Special rates of depreciation targeting export 
industries were reduced in 1988 due to the continuing trade surpluses in the latter half of 
the 1980s.
32
  Meanwhile, tax benefits with respect to R&D of capital goods industries 
were introduced in 1995 to develop such industries.
33
  Currently, tax benefits are based 
on the function-oriented support principle and are provided mainly to FDI inflows and 
R&D activities.  For instance, as of 2005, in the case of foreign investors‟ investment 
in areas designated as the FDI region, profits and income taxes are exempt for the first 
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ten years from establishment.  Tax deductions are provided to 50 percent (40 percent in 
case of large firms) of the new R&D expenditure.
34
  Tax benefits directly relating to EP 
are currently not available.  
 
b. duty drawback scheme
35
 
 
Duty drawback scheme can be used as a measure of EP by reducing the cost of 
producing exported products.  Meanwhile, since the procedure of drawback may be 
complicated under certain circumstances, the social cost born by the government, banks 
and exporting firms may be too high to promote exports.
36
  Therefore, its effect on EP 
would depend on the efficiency of the scheme that is actually practiced.  Although 
most tax benefits targeting EP have been prohibited by the WTO Subsidies Code, duty 
drawback not exceeding the amount of duty actually levied on the imported product has 
been permitted. 
 
The government began to use the duty drawback scheme to promote exports in 1975.  
As of the mid- to late 1980s, Korea‟s duty drawback system has been set more 
generously than that of Taiwan, its one of main competitors, so as to give more subsidy 
to exporters.
37
  According to the Special Act for Duty Drawback in Korea, the 
imported raw materials that were used to produce export products within thirteen 
months from import qualified for duty drawback, which was applied to Korea until 
1997.  Since 1997, the Act changed the period to two years.  Although duty 
drawbacks recognized by specific items are more difficult to administer, such types 
share more than four-fifths of the entire duty drawback cases in Korea.
38
    
 
The drawback rate defined as the amount of duty drawback divided by export values 
increased from 0.3 percent in 1975 to 2.6 percent in 1990.  Table 3 shows that the 
amount of duty drawback was as low as 0.1 trillion won, equivalent to U.S.$ 0.2 billion, 
in 1975, while it continued to increase to 3.2 trillion won in 2009, equivalent to US$ 2.7 
billion.  Due to continuing trade surpluses during the 2000s, it fell to 0.8 percent in 
2009.  The ratio of duty drawback/import tariff collection has been between 17 percent 
and 27 percent during 1990 – 2009.  It reached 38.4 percent in 2001.  In 2009, it was 
recorded as 21.6 percent.    
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Table 3.   Duty Drawback/Export Values and Duty Drawback/Tariff Collection 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Years    Amount of Duty       Duty Drawback duty drawback 
 Drawback (trillion won)     /Export Values  /tariff collection 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1975  0.1         0.3   n.a. 
1990  1.2   2.6   24.0 
2000  2.2   1.0   21.0 
2009  3.2   0.8   21.6 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Sources:  IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2005; Korea Customs 
Office,  
Customs Yearbook, various issues; http://mosf.go.kr, Performance of duty  
drawback, accessed September 28, 2010 
 
B. Financial Incentives 
 
The Ministry of Finance strictly controlled the commercial banks of Korea up until the 
early 1980s.  Policy loans, i.e. lending at preferential rates due to the policy direction, 
were provided to specific, mostly export-related, industries.  Currently, export 
insurance is the main financial incentive relating to EP. 
 
a. policy loans  
 
The government had regulated most interest rates by the end of 1988.  The government 
control of interest rates provided the strategic industries preferential access at subsidized 
interest rates.  As a result of the HCI Drive in the 1970s, the HCI sector not only had 
better access to capital, but also faced significantly lower average borrowing costs.  
The export industries enjoyed preferential access to capital.
39
 The government-owned 
Korea Development Bank also supported certain industries.  During the 1970s, policy 
loans at preferential interest rates increased from less than 40 percent of total bank 
lending in 1971 to over 55 percent during 1976-1977 and 70 percent in 1978.
40
  The 
interest rate differential between preferential and ordinary loans was abolished with the 
June 1982 interest-rate reform.
41
   
 
The HCI sector not only enjoyed preferential access to capital, but also faced 
significantly lower average borrowing costs.  It was favored considerably in the second 
half of the 1970s.  Although its average borrowing cost had been about the same as 
that of the LI until 1974, it began to fall sharply from 1975 until the late 1970s and the 
borrowing cost averaged 36 percent lower for the HCI than the LI (Cho and Kim 
(1997)).  Since chaebols, i.e. the large conglomerates in Korea, were mostly involved 
in the HCI, they were the main beneficiaries of policy loans.  The share of the HCI in 
all manufacturing industries increased gradually from 23 percent in 1960 to 39 percent 
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in 1970, and to 54 percent in 1980, respectively.
42
  Policy loans at preferential lending 
interest rate were mainly directed to chaebols, which were appropriate for HCI showing 
the economies of scale property.  Therefore, chaebols began to grow rapidly in Korea 
in particular during the 1970s. 
 
In 1980, the government decided to reduce policy loans and restrictions on the 
managerial autonomy of the commercial banks, with the ultimate goal of privatizing 
them.
43
  Due to the continuing trade balance surpluses in the late 1980s and the 
pressure of economic liberalization from abroad, the government liberalized most 
interest rates officially in December 1988.
44
  Nowadays, policy loans can be found in 
the lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and are not directly related 
to EP.  
 
b. export finances 
 
Export finances have been provided to exporters in various stages of export-related 
activities since 1961.  Exporters received huge amount of interest rate subsidies during 
the 1960s – 1980s.  Even if the applied lending interest rate was not preferential, such 
guarantees of lending per se can be considered as beneficial to the industries of a 
developing country facing the liquidity constraint.
 45
  The export finance system is one 
of the currently used export promotion measure in Korea.  The Korea EXIM Bank has 
lent to the export firms.
46
  Export finance covers mainly capital goods, such as 
industrial plant, machinery, and ships.  As of 2009, lending of up to 100 percent of 
contract value is available provided that the minimum foreign exchange earnings ratio is 
not less than 25 percent.  The average interest rate applicable to export finance was 
three percent during 1998-1999, which was lower than the market average lending rate 
of 8.5–20 percent in 1999.47  The ratio of exports supported by the EXIM Bank 
divided by total exports reached 18.6 percent in 2007.  Together with the Korea 
Export-Import Bank, commercial banks in Korea also provide export finance to 
exporters; meanwhile, they charge the prevailing lending interest rates.
48
  In 2009, the 
Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) guarantees repayment of the amount of SMEs‟ 
borrowing from commercial banks, which is related to export.  It guarantees up to ten 
billion won.  The amount of guarantee provided to exporting enterprises by the KCGF 
reached 4.2 trillion won and 4.6 trillion won, respectively, in 2006 and 2007.
49
 
 
 
                                            
42
 Chang, (1994), op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
43
 Haggard, Stephan and Susan Collins, “The Political Adjustment in the 1980s”, in Haggard, Stephan, et. 
al. eds., Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970-1990, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1994, pp. 75-110. 
44
 Youn, Won Bae, “Financial Liberalization”, in The Dictionary of Economics, Pakyoungsa: Seoul, 1998 
(in Korean). 
45
 Mah (2006), op. cit. 
46
 Korea Export-Import Bank, http://www.koreaeximbank.go.kr, 2004. 
47
 WTO, op. cit., Ch. III, para. 133. 
48
 The Korea Exchange Bank, http://www.keb.co.kr, accessed May 16, 2009. 
49
 The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, Annual Report 2007, http://www.kodit.co.kr, accessed May 16, 
2009.  Total capital funds of the KCGF amounted to about 4 trillion won in 2007. 
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c. export insurances 
 
The export insurance scheme was introduced into Korea in 1969 under the Export 
Insurance Act to help exporters increase their exports by protecting them against losses.  
The Export Insurance Fund (EIF) was established to support it.  The amount of the EIF 
totaled 1.5 trillion won, i.e. about US$1.2 billion, in 2008.  During the period 1968-
1972, the value of exports supported by export insurance, i.e. the utilization ratio of 
export insurance, had been lower than 1 percent and had remained at around 3 percent 
during the 1980s.  The government began to emphasize the role of export incentives 
such as export insurances and established the KEIC in 1992 as one fully devoted to the 
export insurance scheme in Korea.
50
   
 
With the establishment of the KEIC,
51
 as shown in Table 4, the utilization ratio of 
export insurance increased abruptly to 21.7 percent on annual average during 2003-2004.  
It rose to 37.8 percent in 2009 and Korea is currently the heaviest user of the export 
insurance system.  The Export Insurance Act requires the Export Insurance Fund to 
finance the insurance programs, if the KEIC should run budget deficits.  The loss ratio, 
defined as claims paid divided by premium received, remained less than 100 percent in 
general up to 1991, implying that the preferential effect of government subsidization in 
the form of export insurance was not significant until the early 1990s.
52
   
The annual average loss ratio was as high as 325 percent in 2003-2004, showing that the 
preferential effect of the export insurance scheme was significant, although it fell to 122 
percent in 2008-2009 due to increase in recoveries.   
 
Table 4 shows that the total amount of claims and premium revenues amounted to 
US$ 0.7 billion and US$ 0.6 billion during 2008-2009, respectively; while recoveries 
increased to US$ 0.3 billion, equaling more than one third of claims payment.  The 
number of underwriting contracts increased from 415,991 cases in 2006 to 535,864 
cases in 2009.
53
  By types, the insured amount of the Foreign Investment Insurance 
began to increase remarkably in 2006 and 2007.  For instance, although it had not been 
larger than 100 billion won until 2005, it increased to 132 billion won in 2006, 482 
billion won in 2007, 982 billion won in 2008 and 638 billion won in 2009,
54
 which 
reflects the recent increase in Korea‟s foreign direct investment outflows; for instance, 
US$ 8.1 billion in 2006, US$ 15.6 billion in 2007, US$ 18.9 billion in 2008 and 
US$ 10.6 billion in 2009 due to the continuing current account surpluses and 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves.  Since the duty drawback not exceeding the 
                                            
50
 For further details on evolution of the KEIC, refer to Mah, Jai S. and Yunah Song, “The Export 
Insurance System of Korea: Its Implications on the Trade Regulations in the Global Trading System”, 
Journal of World Trade, August 2001, Vol. 35, No. 4. 
51
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(K-sure), K-sure Annual Report 2009, K-sure: Seoul, 2010 (2010b)). 
52
 Mah and Song, op. cit.  
53
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54
 Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-sure), Export Insurance Magazine, K-sure: Seoul, January-
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threshold level and export insurances complying with the OECD Arrangement on 
Export Credits are not prohibited, export insurance is expected to continue as an 
important measure of EP of Korea under the WTO system.   
 
Table 4.  Export Insurance Scheme of Korea            (units: US$ 100 million, %) 
____________________________________________________________________________________
export  insured   premium   claims   recoveries  utilization   loss      
years         values  amount   received    paid        (E)       ratio      ratio 
                (A)     (B)       (C)        (D)                 (B/A:%)    (D/C:%)  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1974-1976    182.5     1.5      0.01      0.01       0.00       0.8        41.4 
1983-1985   1,053.9    42.5     0.28      0.06       0.01       4.0        22.1 
1989-1991   2,115.2    49.6     0.14      1.55       0.02       2.3      1,082.9 
1992-1994   2,705.8   118.2     0.77      1.45       0.11       4.4       187.9 
2003-2004   4,481.2   970.4     2.12      6.90       1.75      21.7       325.2   
2008-2009   8,065.0  2,444.1    5.94      7.14       2.57      30.3       122.2 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  Export values (A) denote the aggregate income that result from commodity  
exports and from overseas construction.  Claims paid (D) is based on the year  
paid, not the year underwritten. 
Sources: KEIC, Annual Report and Monthly Export Insurance, various issues; K-sure,  
Annual Report 2009, 2010 (2010b).    
 
C.  The Other Policies and Organizations  
 
a. Free Trade Zones  (FTZs) 
 
FTZs in Korea have been governed by the Law on the Free Trade Zones.  FTZs are 
exclusive areas outside the national customs boundary, exempt from customs 
requirements, upon request from regional governments.  Activities in the FTZs are 
subject to streamlined import procedures and exemption from import tariffs, and receive 
tax relief, e.g. value-added tax and reduced corporate tax.  Foreign cargo may enter 
and leave freely from the FTZs.  Since Korean goods entering the FTZs are treated as 
exports, they are entitled to duty drawback.  The FTZs are located in several places.
55
  
Currently, to be qualified to enter the FTZ, more than 50 percent of total sales amount 
should be exported.  The amount of foreign investment should be over 50 million 
Korean won, i.e. about US$40 thousand, and the ratio of foreign investment should be 
over 10 percent.
56
  
 
The Masan Free Trade Zone (FTZ), originally called the Free Export Zone, focusing on 
EP was established in Korea in 1970 as the first foreign exclusive industrial complex in 
Korea.  It was expected to contribute to the national and local economy by attracting 
more FDI inflows.  It has concentrated on manufacturing.
57
  It is a seaside industrial 
complex and has offered the benefits of being in close proximity to highways, railways 
                                            
55
 WTO, op. cit., Ch. III, para. 22. 
56
Source: Administrative Authority of Masan Free Trade Zone,  
http://www.ftz.go.kr/eng/investment/conditions.jsp, accessed April 16, 2009. 
57
Source: http://www.kishtpc.com/Free-en/free_korea.htm, accessed April 16, 2009. 
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and, particularly, seaports.  Besides, near to it, aviation, shipbuilding, automobile and 
machinery components have been densely populated, providing the benefits of an inter-
industry relation effects. 
 
Table 5 shows that the Masan FTZ was most lively during the second half of the 1970s 
– the second half of the 1980s.  In 1987, the number of workers employed in the 
Masan FTZ reached 36,411.  Some 98 percent of products produced within this zone 
are exported.  The Masan FTZ exported about US$50 billion and employed about 6 
thousand workers in 2008, which does not share a significant proportion in the Korean 
economy nowadays, but shares about 2 percent of exports.
58
  Overall, the FTZs played 
an important role until the 1980s, especially in EP.   
 
Table 5.  Economic Performance of Masan FTZ      (unit: number, US$ million) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Year number of  number of persons  exports  imports of   amount of    foreign 
          firms          employed              raw materials  domestic    capital  
        capital     inflows 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1972       70             7,106          9.7       6.7          2.0       34.9 (95) 
1977       99            30,719        367.9      203.5       10.5       93.5 (90) 
1987       75            36,411       1,399.5     799.2       26.3      137.3 (84) 
1997       75            14,682       2,201.3    1,327.0       57.0      185.5 (77) 
2008       94             5,936       5,072.2    3,103.9       83.7      144.3 (63)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Administration Office of the Masan Free Trade Zone, http://www.ftz.go.kr 
/kor/Morgue/Total/totalyear.jsp, accessed April 15, 2009                 
Note:  Values within the parentheses denote the share (percent) of foreign capital in 
total amount of investment. 
 
b. Exchange Rate 
 
The Korean won had been pegged to US$ until early 1980.  It had been devalued from 
190 won/US$ to 255 won/US$ in 1964, to 317 won/US$ in 1970 and then to 399 
won/US$ in 1972.  The exchange rate had been fixed at 484 won/US$ between 1974 
and 1980.  Although devaluation (or depreciation) per se can be regarded as beneficial 
to EP, the fact that the Korean economy continued to show trade deficits until the first 
half of the 1980s imply that exchange rate did not act basically as a measure of effective 
EP policy.  The exchange rate system was changed into the managed flexible exchange 
rate system in February 1980.  Since then the exchange rate was determined basically 
by the market forces in the foreign exchange market, while the government has 
intervened in it from time to time to counter volatile exchange rates. 
 
c. Organizations 
 
In Korea, Korea International Trade Association (KITA) and Korea Trade Promotion 
                                            
58
 Sources: http://www.kishtpc.com/Free-en/free_korea.htm, accessed April 16, 2009 and Administration 
Office of Masan FTZ, http://www.ftz.go.kr/kor/Morgue/Total /totalInvest.jsp, accessed April 16, 2009.  
Currently, as of September 2010, there are several FTZs in Korea. 
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Corporation (KOTRA) have worked as the institutions helping firms overcoming the 
export barriers such as the motivational, informational, and operational/resource barriers.  
KOTRA was established in 1962 as a national trade promotion organization.  Since 
then, it has facilitated Korea‟s rapid export-led economic growth through various trade 
promotion activities such as overseas market surveys and business matchmaking.  In 
1995, cross-border investment promotion and support for technological and industrial 
cooperation projects were added to KOTRA‟s mandate, and it was renamed the Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.  As of April 2009, there are some 100 Korea 
Trade Centers in 73 countries.
59
  In 2007, total such government promotional 
expenditure on export promotion amounted to 34 billion won; most of which financed 
participation in overseas trade missions and exhibitions.
60
 
 
 
V. Lessons of the Experience of Korea Regarding Export Promotion 
 
The Korean government provided various tax and financial incentives to promote export 
until the early to mid-1980s in particular.  The concerned literature shows that the EP 
policies contributed to the expansion of export values.  Exports of manufactured 
products had increased significantly during the 1960s and 1970s.  The share of exports 
of more value added capital intensive and technology intensive products has risen since 
the 1970s.  Rapid increase of export values appears to have led to economic growth of 
Korea, supporting the export-led economic growth strategy.   
 
Although such EP policies of Korea appear to have benefited economic growth of Korea 
in the sense of economies of scale and improvement of technologies facing fierce 
industrial competition from abroad, one may notice the role of changing economic 
structure and export composition in economic development.  That is, in case of Korea, 
the share of exports of value-added commodities divided by that of labor intensive 
textiles and garment (or primary products) has increased for the past half century.
61
  It 
can be compared with the experiences of the other countries showing very high trade 
dependence ratio.  For instance, although Papua New Guinea that relies heavily on 
exports of primary products shows the trade dependence ratio higher than 140 percent, 
its economic growth rates have been mediocre since independence in 1975.  It means 
that together with EP policies per se, one needs to pay attention to EP of manufactured 
products (and more value-added manufactured products in particular), the composition 
of export products and the other factors such as human capital.   
 
Therefore, it is necessary for the policymakers of developing countries to recognize the 
importance of export-led growth, in particular growth led by exports of manufactured 
products.  In addition, it would also be necessary for developing countries to enhance 
the administrative capacity to implement EP schemes, enhance the education level of 
the public in order to improve the capacity of producing value-added manufactured 
products, establish and maintain institutions that developing countries do not have, but 
allowed in the WTO system, direct official development assistance to enhancing export 
                                            
59
  KOTRA, “About KOTRA - History” (available at http://english.kotra.or.kr, accessed April 20, 2009). 
60
 WTO, Trade Policy Review – Korea, WTO: Geneva, 2008, Ch. III, para. 125 and 126. 
61
 See Koh and Mah, op. cit.  
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capacities, and utilize the currently existing special and differential treatment provisions 
in the WTO in favor of developing countries.
62
   
 
EP policies may lead to economic growth via expansion of export values, as is shown in 
case of Korea.   Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that such aggressive EP policies through 
strict control of commercial banks can lead to resource allocational inefficiency in some 
cases and distortion in the banking and corporate sector.
63
  Therefore, the problems of 
EP in economic structure are to be recognized. 
 
Since the current regulations strictly regulate developing countries with respect to EP 
policies, it is worthwhile to think of granting developing countries policy space.  From 
the viewpoint of „distributional fairness‟, one may doubt the fairness of the current 
WTO system, which regulates the use of EP policies regardless of extremely different 
level of economic development.  Therefore, it would be necessary for developing 
countries to think of concrete ideas and put pressures on modifying the WTO 
regulations in favor of promoting their exports, export of manufactured products in 
particular.
64
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
During the period of rapid economic growth, the Korean government provided tax and 
financial incentives and established export-promoting organizations.  As a result of EP 
policies, export values rose significantly.  Beginning from the early 1980s, the 
government changed the policy direction from direct subsidization of selective 
industries and firms toward function-oriented support such as general support for R&D 
activities.  The transition from the LI to the HCI and then to technology-intensive 
industries led to the higher value-added industrial structure and contributed to economic 
growth.  Meanwhile, the rapid economic growth was accompanied by structural 
problems.  That is, the accumulated non-performing loans of commercial banks 
became one of the causes of the economic crisis in 1998.  
 
Under the current WTO system which prohibits the direct export promotion measures, 
Korea does not provide export subsidies in general that are prohibited by the WTO 
regulations.  Meanwhile, export incentives provided by the government such as duty 
drawback and export insurance schemes are actively utilized.  The FTZs are in 
operation and expected to be strengthened mainly to attract FDI from abroad.  
Exchange rate is no longer used to promote exports.  There are government-supported 
EP organizations.  These types of EP can also be provided by other developing 
countries.  That is, the governments of developing countries would benefit from 
maintaining and strengthening the appropriate institutions relating to EP such as the 
                                            
62
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export insurance and duty drawback schemes subject to the budget constraint, which are 
not prohibited under the current WTO system.  In addition, it would be necessary for 
the WTO Members to think of the concrete ways of modifying the concerned WTO 
regulations in favor of the developing countries‟ use of EP policies from the viewpoint 
of distributional fairness.  
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